The notion of a critical successor [dJV90] has been central to almost all modal completeness proofs in interpretability logics. In this paper we shall work with an alternative notion, that of an assuring successor. As we shall see, this will enable more concisely formulated completeness proofs, both with respect to ordinary and generalised Veltman semantics. Due to their interesting theoretical properties, we will devote some space to the study of a particular kind of assuring labels, the so-called full labels. After a general treatment of assuringness, we shall apply it to obtain certain completeness results. Namely, we give another proof of completeness of ILW w.r.t. ordinary semantics and of ILP w.r.t. generalised semantics.
Introduction
This paper is about a technical aspect of interpretability logics. Interpretability logics are propositional modal logics that naturally extend provability logic.
The provability logic GL is a propositional modal logic with a unary modality that describes the notion of formal provability. Consequently, the dual modality refers to consistency. The logic GL comes with a natural Kripke semantics where the truth conditions concerning the modalities are modeled using a binary accessibility relation usually denoted by R.
It is well-known that GL is complete with respect to its relational semantics ([Seg71] ). The modal completeness proof is as usual performed by building a sort of term model. That is to say, we build semantics out of syntax. Thus, one considers maximal GL-consistent sets which will be worlds in the Kripke model. The R relation between maximal consistent sets is defined in such a way that the resulting structure yields a GL-model.
Provability logic describes, in precise sense, all the behavior about formal provability of a theory that can be proven by that particular theory. In a similar fashion, interpretability logics describe the provable behaviour of relativised interpretability. Now, a binary modality is used where the intended reading of ϕ ψ is that some base theory T together with (the arithmetical reading of) ϕ interprets T together with (the arithmetical reading of) ψ. By doing so, we will see that ϕ is equivalent to ¬A ⊥ so that interpretability logics indeed naturally extend provability logic.
Whereas the logic of provability is very stable and the same for basically any sound and strong enough theory, the situation with interpretability logics differs a lot. Different theories have different interpretability logics which make them interesting to study.
Interpretability logics also come with a Kripke-like semantics. Their models are called Veltman models and they naturally extend models for provability. The truth conditions for the binary modality is now governed by a ternary relation S between worlds in a Veltman model.
For various interpretability logics, we also know completeness w.r.t. the respective class of Veltman models. Again, completeness proofs proceed by constructing a sort of term model. From now on we will write MCS as short-hand for maximal consistent set and confide that the context will reveal with respect to which logic we demand consistency. For the current discussion we will actually not specify the respective logics at all.
Since interpretability logics extend provability logic we will again have a binary accessibility relation between MCS's. However, it turns out to be much more difficult to define the ternary accessibility relation S. The reason is that a single MCS may be needed in various roles now (we shall see a concrete example later in Figure 3 ).
The first completeness proofs for interpretability logics [dJV90] went about this by labeling these roles inside the model. As such a single MCS could occur multiple times in a model with different labels. The labels that were used in the old days were used to flag so-called criticality.
Criticality flagged that a particular MCS had a particular functionality in the Veltman model. This functionality however propagates to parts accessible (either via R or S) from that particular MCS. As such, completeness proofs could be very difficult and involved. Various different techniques were invented to keep track of all the different roles.
Some times this could be done by keeping very close track of what roles could come after what other roles ([dJV90] , [GJ12] ). In other occasions one had to consider many roles at the same time so as to avoid uncontrolled interaction between them ( [dJV99] , [GJ08] ).
In 2004, the first author of this paper invented a slight variation of critical labels and called them assuring labels. This variation now allowed to consider various roles at the same time. Where critical labels just keep track of a role with respect to one particular formula, the assuring labels actually are sets of formulas flagging that a MCS plays a role simultaneously with respect to all formulas in the set.
As a first application of assuring labels a one-page completeness proof of the logic ILW was given in [BGJ04] . This should be contrasted with the very convoluted and complicated original completeness proof of around five pages based on criticality [dJV99] .
In years after the publication of [BGJ04] , all new completeness proofs used the assuring labels and in [MV20] a uniform treatment of completeness proofs with respect to so-called generalised Veltman semantics could be given by making essential use of assuring labels.
The current paper is an expansion of [BGJ04] which was written on the occasion of Dick de Jongh's 60th birthday. A major draw-back of that paper is that it was actually written for Dick de Jongh and the paper assumed so much knowledge of the fields that virtually only Dick de Jongh could read it. Since the new technique has turned out to be so important, we decided to elaborate the old paper, make it self-contained, develop more of the theory and prove new results culminating in the current paper.
As such, Section 2 contains the needed technical preliminaries for the remainder of the paper. Then, in Section 3 we motivate the main notion of this paper: assuring labels.
In Section 4 we develop the general theory of assuring labels. Next, in Section 5 we shall see how assuring labels are good for imposing frame conditions on collections of MCS's. This will be useful in completeness proofs.
To illustrate the applicability, in Section 7 we give a short completeness and decidability proof of the logic ILW and Section 6 serves as a preparation.
Finally, Section 8 analyses in a sense how iterations of labels may be needed in various situations, for example when considering the logic ILWR. As an illustration we prove completeness of ILP with respect to a class of generalised Veltman frames where this iteration of labels is accounted for.
Preliminaries
The language of interpretability logics is given by
where p ranges over a countable set of propositional variables. Other Boolean connectives are defined as abbreviations as usual. We treat as having higher priority than →, but lower than other logical connectives. We do not include in the language, rather we take A as an abbreviation for ¬ ¬A.
Definition 2.1. The interpretability logic IL is axiomatised by the following axiom schemas.
(Taut) classical tautologies (in the new language);
The rules of inference are Modus Ponens and Necessitation: A/ A.
We will write
The following lemma is easy and we will use it throughout the paper, often tacitly. Even though the proof is well-known and easy, we choose to include it as a warm-up for later reasoning so that we see the axioms at work.
Lemma 2.2. The following are provable in IL.
A →
A;
2. A ≡ ¬A ⊥;
5. For any formula A we have A ≡ ⊥.
Proof. Item 1 is actually known to hold in GL. We observe that in IL we can give an alternative proof: since ¬A ¬A, by J4 we get ¬A → ¬A and contraposition yields the required A → A. Item 2 has two directions. First we observe that A → (¬A → ⊥) so that by (J1) we obtain ¬A ⊥. For the other direction, we apply (J4) to ¬A ⊥ to obtain ¬A → ⊥. Since ⊥ is provably (actually in GL) equivalent to ⊥ we obtain ¬A → ⊥ which is just ¬ ¬A, that is, A.
Item 3 has just one non-trivial direction. To address this, we observe that A (A ∧ ¬A) ∨ (A ∧ A) so that by (J3) and (J2) we are done once we show (A ∧ A) A ∧ ¬A. By contraposing an instance of (L) we obtain A → (A ∧ ¬A) so by Necessitation and (J1) we obtain A (A ∧ ¬A). Now (J5) yields (A ∧ ¬A) A ∧ ¬A so that (J2) gives A A ∧ ¬A. The result follows since clearly A ∧ A A. Item 4 is easy since C → (B → B ∧ C) so that B B ∧ C. Finally, Item 5 follows easily from (L) since A → ⊤ which implies ( ⊥ → ⊥) so that ⊥. ⊣
In this paper we shall consider extensions of IL with the following principles.
There are two basic and mutually related semantics for interpretability logics. In both cases, the ternary relation S will be conceived as a collection of parametrised binary relations. The first, and the most commonly used semantics, is Veltman semantics (or ordinary Veltman semantics).
where W is a non-empty set, R is a transitive and converse well-founded binary relation on W and for all w ∈ W we have: Uppercase Greek, like Γ and ∆, will denote maximal consistent sets (MCS's). It will be clear from the context with respect to what logic the consistency will refer. Uppercase Roman denotes modal interpretability formulas A, B, C, . . . or sets of such formulas S, T, U, . . .. An exception to this rule is that we might write formulas from a set S as S i , S j etc. in particular if S is a set of formulas the S i denotes a finite disjunction over some formulas in S. If we talk of logics we mean extensions of IL. As usual we use ⊡A as an abbreviation for A ∧ A. If S is a set of formulas then we write S for { A | A ∈ S}.
Extending criticality
As mentioned before, completeness proofs typically follow the following scheme. We take a formula A that is not provable. Hence ¬A is included in some MCS Γ. Next define the binary relation R on MCS's together with the ternary relation S so that the resulting structure is a model of the logic under consideration. Finally, we prove a so-called Truth lemma that states
(1)
Now, since ¬A ∈ Γ we get that A is falsified somewhere in our model. It is easy to see that a least requirement for (1) to hold with respect to formulas of the form C is that whenever ΓR∆ we have for any A ∈ Γ that A, A ∈ ∆. This consideration gives rise to defining the following relation between MCS's. 
We will now investigate what (1) imposes on the S relation. In particular. let us consider the condition for a formula ¬(A B) to be true in some world x in some particular model. From the previous section we know that x ¬(A B) if and only if there is some world y so that xRy, so that y A but for no z for which yS x z will we have z B. In particular, since yS x y we see that y ¬B. Moreover, since yRu → yS x u we also see that y ¬A. Thus, certain relations ΓR∆ actually should come with a promise that for any ∆ ′ with ∆S Γ ∆ ′ we will have ¬B, ¬B ∈ ∆ ′ . Of course, we should also have ¬C, ¬C ∈ ∆ ′ for any C so that C B. Let us introduce the notion of criticality from [dJV90] .
Definition 3.2. For MCS's Γ and ∆ and for C a formula, we say that ∆ is a C-critical successor of Γ whenever
We will write Γ ≺ C ∆ in this case. 1
It is easy to see that C-criticality naturally extends the ≺ relation as reflected by the following easy lemma.
We can see C-criticality as a promise that the formula C will be avoided in a strong sense. All completeness proofs before [BGJ04] made essential use of critical successors. Whenever in a structure of MCS's a Γ ≺ C ∆ was there, the definition of the S Γ relation should reflect the promise that C should be avoided. This strategy, although successful, resulted in a need for complicated book-keeping to keep all promises.
An improvement can be made if we can deal with various promises at the same time. Suppose we wished to define Γ ≺ B,C ∆ in such a way that it promises that both B and C are avoided in ∆ in a strong sense. Requiring that simultaneously both Γ ≺ B ∆ and Γ ≺ C ∆ is not sufficient since the promises may interact. In particular if A B ∨ C ∈ Γ we should also require that ¬A, ¬A ∈ ∆.
It is this simple idea that adds a lot of power to the notion of criticality. However there is one more subtlety to it. It turns out to be very fruitful to apply a change of perspective. Instead of speaking of a promise to avoid certain formulas it turns out to be a very fruitful perspective to rather speak of assuring certain formulas. If we do so, it will turn out that the set of promises has certain nice properties. In particular, it can be closed under logic consequence as proven in Lemma 4.7. These considerations give rise to the following definition.
Definition 3.4 (Assuring successor). Let S be a set of formulas. We define Γ≺ S ∆, and say that ∆ is an S-assuring successor of Γ, if for any finite S ′ ⊆ S we have A Sj ∈S ′ ¬S j ∈ Γ ⇒ ¬A, ¬A ∈ ∆ and for some C ∈ ∆ we have C ∈ Γ. We will call S a label for Γ and ∆ or simply a label.
In the following lemma we shall see that the notion of assuring successor on sets of formulas naturally extends the regular successor relation as well as the critical successor relation.
Lemma 3.5.
Proof. For the first item, we observe that the empty conjunction is per definition equivalent to ⊥. Thus, by Lemma 2.2.2 we have A ⊥ ∈ Γ if and only if ¬A ∈ Γ. Consequently,
Since we work in classical logic, the right-hand side is easily seen to be equivalent
The ⇐ direction of the second item is easy and the other direction follows from the first item of this lemma: if we take a finite subset of {¬B} this is either the empty set, or {¬B} itself. Now, A ¬¬B ∈ Γ ⇒ ¬A, ¬A ∈ ∆ follows from the assumption that ∆ is a B-critical successor of Γ and A ⊥ ∈ Γ ⇒ ¬A, ¬A ∈ ∆ follows from the first item since critical successors are in particular successors. ⊣
The theory of assuring labels and of full labels
In this section we will expose a general theory of assuring successors. In the next section we will show how assuring successors can be used to solve, in a uniform way, certain problematic aspects of modal completeness proofs.
As the name suggests, assuring labels assure certain formulas to be present. This is made explicit in the following lemma.
Lemma 4.1. The relation ≺ S assures elements in Γ and ∆ although it is not allowed to speak of consistency formulas.
3. Γ≺ S ∆ ⇒ the label S does not contain any formula of the form A.
Proof. The first item is clear since for any σ ∈ S we have that ¬σ ¬σ is a theorem and whence in Γ. By the definition of Γ≺ S ∆ we get that σ, σ ∈ ∆.
The second item follows from the first: since Γ is maximal, for any σ ∈ Σ, either σ ∈ Γ or ¬σ ∈ Γ. However, the latter would imply ¬σ ∈ ∆ contradiction our first item.
For the last item we reason as follows. Suppose for a contradiction that there is some A in S. Then, by the first item we have both A ∈ ∆ and A ∈ ∆. However, over GL we have that A is equivalent to ⊥. But ⊥ ∈ ∆ clearly contradicts A ∈ ∆. ⊣ A label S between Γ≺ S ∆ keeps track of the formulas that are promised to be in Γ and ∆ in virtue of certain interpretability formulas in Γ. The larger the label, the more promises it stores.
Often we can enlarge the label for free. To see how much we can add we need to following definition. 
Note that ∆ ∅ = { ¬A | A ⊥ ∈ ∆}. However, we want to think about this set as { C | C ∈ ∆}. Clearly the two sets, although not literally equal, behave the same when used within labels. Furthermore, note that Γ ≺ S ∆ holds precisely if Γ ⊡ S ⊆ ∆. The next lemma tells us how promises propagate over composition of successors.
Lemma 4.3. For the relation ≺ S we have the following observations.
Proof. The first item is obvious since any finite subset of S is also a finite subset of T whenever S ⊆ T . For the second item we observe that
Often we shall simply write ¬S i to indicate some particular finite disjunction without really specifying it. If in the same context we will need another particular but otherwise unspecified big disjunction we will flag this by using a different index. Thus ¬S i ∨ ¬S j stands for the disjunction of two particular but unspecified finite disjunctions of negated formulas from some label set S. Often we will consider a finite collection of formulas C j such that each C j will interpret some finite disjunction of negated formulas from the label S. For each particular formula C j we will denote the corresponding disjunction by ¬S j k and thus write C j ¬S j k . Subsequently, we will denote the big disjunction over all k and all corresponding ¬S k j by ¬S k j so that C k ¬S k j . The following lemma gives us a way to extend labels. Proof. Suppose Γ≺ S ∆ and C ¬S i ∨ A j ∨ A j ∈ Γ for some finite collection of formulas ¬A j , ¬A j ∈ Γ ⊡ S . In particular, for each j we have A j ¬S j k for some finite collection (depending on j) of formulas S j k from the label S.
This lemma tells us in a sense that when we have Γ≺ S ∆, then certain sentences in Γ justify that we may extend the label S. Will likewise the occurrence of sentences in ∆ allow us to extend the label S? The next lemma tells us that this is not the case. In particular, if A ¬S i for some S i ∈ S ′ ⊆ fin S, then by definition ¬A, ¬A ∈ ∆. However, when for some arbitrary A we have ¬A, ¬A ∈ ∆, this does not allow us to extend our label S.
Proof. Consider the model consisting of three points x, y and z given in Figure  1 . We take Γ to be the modal theory of x and ∆ to be the modal theory of y. Since q ∈ ∆ and (q ¬p) ∈ Γ, whatever we take for S with Γ≺ S ∆, we will never have Γ≺ S∪{p} ∆. ⊣ Thus, via the previous two lemmas we see that the S-assuringness between two sets Γ≺ S ∆ can only be automatically extended via Γ. The next lemma tells us that there are other ways to 'freely extend' a label.
Lemma 4.7. For any logic we have
Proof. For the first item-full labels are closed under logical consequence-we assume that S ⊢ ϕ where the notion of logical consequence depends on the logic in question. Thus for some S 1 , . . . ,
For the second item, we consider (
This Lemma 4.7 tells us that we can freely extend labels to be closed under ILX consequences and to be closed under necessitation. Thus, we can identify labels with ILX theories.
Moreover, Lemma 4.5 tells us that we can freely close off a label S for Γ≺ S ∆ under Γ ⊡ S . These observations lead us to the definition of Γ-full labels. When the context makes clear which Γ is meant we shall simply speak of full labels.
Definition 4.8. For Γ a maximal consistent set we call S a Γ-full label whenever S is an ILX-theory extending Γ ⊡ S . In concrete, S is a Γ-full label whenever we have the following:
If we stick to full labels, there is a close correspondence between theories and labels. We find this observation so essential that we formulate it explicitly as a lemma:
Lemma 4.9. If Γ≺ S ∆ and S is full, then S is an ILX-theory.
We pose as open question whether for any consistent ILX-theory S we can find MCS's Γ and ∆ so that Γ≺ S ∆. In case this could be answered in the affirmative it would be interesting to know whether the result can be extended to arbitrary chains of increasing theories.
Full labels contain as many free promises as possible and posses certain nice closure properties. In particular, we have the following lemma that justify the name 'full'. 
The S and T range here over ILX theories, and ∆ over MCS.
Proof. First assume that S is a Γ-full label and S ⊂ T . We want to show there is a MCS ∆ with Γ≺ S ∆ but ¬(Γ≺ T ∆). As S ⊂ T , there is some φ ∈ T for which we have φ / ∈ S, and therefore, by S being
Clearly Γ≺ S ∆, and as ¬φ ¬φ ∈ Γ, φ ∈ T and φ / ∈ ∆, we see that
For the other direction assume Γ ⊡ S ⊆ S. We want to find a theory T ⊃ S with ∀∆ Γ≺ S ∆ ⇒ Γ≺ T ∆ . Take T to be the theory generated by S ∪ Γ ⊡ S : it certainly is bigger then S. Now assume Γ≺ S ∆, but then Γ≺ S∪Γ ⊡ S ∆ by Lemma 4.5. ⊣
Full labels can at times simplify matters. In particular, they clearly propagate along successors as expressed by the following lemma.
Lemma 4.11. If Γ≺ S ∆≺ T Λ, for some full labels S and T , then S ⊆ T .
Proof. For any
Thus, this Lemma states that full labels accrue information along the top successor relation. Does information between related full labels also 'reflect down' ? To put it otherwise, it may be natural to ask if Lemma 4.3.2 (Γ≺ S ∆ ≺ ∆ ′ ⇒ Γ≺ S ∆ ′ ) can be strengthened. That is to say, suppose we have Γ≺ S ∆≺ T ∆ ′ , can we say something more than just Γ≺ S ∆ ′ ? As we shall see in the next section, it turns out that for extensions of IL we often can. In general this does not seem to hold, at least if we do not require our labels to be full. Suppose Γ≺ ∅ ∆≺ {p} ∆ ′ (see Figure 2 ). If p ¬p ∈ Γ and p ∈ ∆ ′ , there is a MCS Λ with ¬p ∈ Λ. Clearly, the fact that we have {p} between ∆ and ∆ ′ did not stop ¬p ∈ Λ. Let us mention a question that we do not have a definite answer for. Suppose Γ≺ S ∆≺ T ∆ ′ and S and T are full labels. Is there a (non-trivial) notion of a "T -influenced formula" such that we may put the T -influenced formulas between Γ and ∆ ′ ? Although a label can be full, this does not mean we can always find a maximum among the possible labels. We shall now exhibit a model that generates maximal consistent sets Γ and ∆ with two incomparable labels between them. Thus, full labels need not necessarily be maximal.
Lemma 4.12. There are maximal consistent sets Γ and ∆ and labels S and T with Γ≺ S ∆ and Γ≺ T ∆ so that ¬(Γ≺ S∪T ∆).
Proof. We let S := {p}, T := {q} and consider the model in Figure 3 . Let Γ be the modal theory of the world w and ∆ be the modal theory of the world u 1 . Clearly, u 1 and u 2 have the same modal theory. ⊣ When Γ≺ S ∆, this enforces many formulas of the form ¬(A B) to be in Γ as we can see in the next lemma.
Lemma 4.13. Let Γ≺ S ∆ with A ∈ ∆ and S ′ ⊆ fin S. We then have
Conversely, the next lemma will show that given a label S and maximal consistent set Γ we have: if there are sufficiently many negated interpretability formulas related to S in Γ, then we can conclude that there exists some MCS ∆ with Γ≺ S ∆. 
Frame conditions and labeling lemmata
Although we do not yet prove completeness of any extension of IL in this section, we recall what steps there are along the way when constructing a countermodel to an unprovable formula. We can think of the step-by-step method of constructing a counter-model used e.g. in [GJ08] for now. Later, in Section 7, we give a proof of completeness and the finite model property for ILW and a proof of completeness for ILP in Section 9, defining a model all at once. The idea in all the cases is to build a model from MCS's and define the R and S Γ accessibility relations on them, where in particular the R relation is to be defined using ≺. We wish to use the labels along ≺ to keep track of the promises posed on later added worlds by already contained interpretability formulas, and, as we shall see, also to be able to ensure we can satisfy the frame conditions corresponding to the additional axiom schemes locally.
Let W be a multiset of MCS's used in the model we wish to define. The main points one has to address are the following three:
Moreover if ∆ is a T -assuring successor of Γ then we should be able to choose ∆ ′ a T -assuring successor of Γ as well (to carry promises along the S Γ relation).
3. We need to make sure all the appropriate frame conditions are satisfied. When working in IL alone, making sure that the frame conditions are satisfied does not pose any problems [dJJ98] , as they are just the basic properties of R and S Γ , but with various extensions of IL the situation regarding the frame conditions for the additional modal principles becomes more complicated (cf. [dJV90, GJ04] ).
Principle P. Let us see how frame conditions locally impose requirements on MCS's, taking ILP as the first example. The frame condition for P is the following [dJV90] :
The frame condition for P imposes on MCS's the following:
When MCS Σ ∋ D is to be chosen to witness a formula C D ∈ Γ ≺ ∆ ∋ C by Item 2, we want to be able to do so in a way where not only Γ ≺ Σ (and the same formulas are assured), but also Λ ≺ Σ. Moreover, if Λ ≺ T ∆, it should be possible to choose Σ so that Λ ≺ T Σ. Only then it is consistent to draw the ∆S Λ Σ arrow required by the frame condition, as depicted in Figure 4 .
To see such requirements are indeed possible to meet, we will prove, for each principle, a labeling lemma. Labeling lemmata tell us how to label the ≺ relation in a sufficient way to ensure we can meet the requirements imposed by frame conditions locally.
In the case of P, a simpler labeling lemma can be used to ensure the frame condition locally, provided we consider the labels that are full (S a Γ-full label, and T a Λ-full label).
Lemma 5.2. For logics containing P we have
Note that the lemma is true in the case of ordinary labels, but in that case, the previous lemma gives us more precise labeling information to ensure the frame condition locally. This is because only for full labels we in fact have
Principle M. The frame condition for M is the following [dJV90] :
The frame condition for M imposes on MCS the following:
When MCS Σ ∋ D is chosen to witness a formula C D ∈ Γ ≺ ∆ ∋ C by Item 2, we want to do so in such a way that whenever we later need to add a MCS Ω with Σ ≺ Ω, we can also draw the ∆ ≺ Ω arrow. Therefore we need to ensure ∆ ∅ along the Γ ≺ Σ arrow (as we remarked previously, one can think of the set ∆ ∅ as simply { C | C ∈ ∆}), we achieve this by ensuring ∆ ∅ along the Γ ≺ ∆ arrow. The situation is depicted in Figure 5 . The corresponding labeling lemma is the following:
In the case of M, we have no simpler labeling lemma in case S is a Γ-full label.
Principle M 0 . The frame condition for M 0 is the following [GJ08]:
The frame condition for M 0 imposes on MCS the following: When MCS Σ ∋ D is chosen to witness a formula C D ∈ Γ ≺ ∆ ≺ ∆ ′ ∋ C by Item 2, we want to do so in such a way that whenever we later need to add a MCS Ω with Σ ≺ Ω, we can also draw the ∆ ≺ Ω arrow. Therefore we again need to ensure ∆ ∅ along the Γ ≺ Σ arrow. The situation is depicted in Figure  6 , and the corresponding labeling lemma is the following (as before, we do not have a special lemma in case the labels are full):
So, since Γ≺ S ∆ and ¬A j ∈ ∆ we obtain ¬C ∈ ∆ and thus ¬C, ¬C ∈ ∆ ′ . ⊣ Principle R. Last we will look at a more complicated case of ILR. The frame condition for the principle R is the following [GJ11] . 4 wRxRyS w y ′ Rz ⇒ yS x z.
On MCS, the condition imposes the following:
The frame condition is depicted in Figure 7 . Assume Σ ∋ D was chosen as a witness for C D ∈ ΓR∆ ∋ C. Since ∆ lies T -assuring above Λ, we should not only make sure that Σ lies S-assuring above Γ, but also that any successor Ω of Σ lies T -assuring above Λ. Only then we would be justified to draw the required ∆S Λ Ω arrow. One way to guarantee Λ≺ T Ω is to ensure Λ T along the Γ ≺ Σ arrow: whenever B
¬T i ∈ Λ, we have ¬B ∈ Λ T and this puts ¬B ∈ Σ and ¬B, ¬B ∈ Ω as required.
The corresponding labeling lemma is the following:
Lemma 5.5. For logics containing R we have Γ≺ S Λ≺ T ∆ ⇒ Γ≺ S∪Λ T ∆.
Proof. We consider A such that for some S i ∈ S and some ¬A j ∈ Λ T , we have
In the case of R, a simpler labeling lemma can be used to ensure the frame condition locally if T is Λ-full:
Then, by R, we obtain ¬(A ¬T j ) ¬S i ∈ Γ and by Γ≺ S Λ we know ⊡(A ¬T j ) ∈ Λ, and ⊡¬A ∈ Σ as required. ⊣
As before in the case of logics containing P and Lemma 5.2, this lemma ensures the frame condition locally provided the labels are full: for in this case Λ ⊡ T ⊆ T and therefore, because T is a theory, Λ T ⊆ T , and consequently S ∪ Λ T ⊆ S ∪ T . Thus sufficient information is carried by the composed label.
Case of ILW. Let us state two existence lemmata for ILW, a logic without a first order frame property. In completeness proofs, a turn that is usually made to obtain finite building blocks is to work with truncated parts of maximal consistent sets. These truncated parts should be large enough to allow for the basic reasoning, and this gives rise to the notion of so-called adequate sets. Note that different logics yield different notions of adequacy. In order to obtain the finite model property along with modal completeness of ILW, in the next section we will use the following notion of adequacy.
Definition 6.1 (Adequate set). We say that a set of formulas Φ is adequate iff
2. Φ is closed under single negation and subformulas;
3. If both A is an antecedent or consequent of some formula in Φ and so is B then A B ∈ Φ.
It is clear that any formula is contained in some finite and minimal adequate set. For a formula F we will denote this set by Φ(F ). Here and in the following section MCS's are subsets of, and maximal w.r.t., some adequate set Φ. Since our maximal consistent sets are more restricted we should also modify the notion of an assuring successor a bit. Definition 6.2 ( S, Φ -assuring successor). Let Φ be a finite adequate set, S ⊆ Φ and Γ, ∆ ⊆ Φ be maximal consistent sets. We say that ∆ is an S, Φassuring successor of Γ (Γ ≺ Φ S ∆) iff for each ¬A ∈ Φ we have
and if moreover for some C ∈ ∆ we have C ∈ Γ.
Note that by the requirement ¬A ∈ Φ the usual reading of ≺ in extensions of GL coincides with ≺ Φ ∅ . So we will write ≺ for ≺ Φ ∅ . The following two lemmas follow from their infinite counterparts, by taking intersections between the sets given by those lemmas, and the set Φ. 
The logic ILW
As a demonstration of the use of assuringness we will give in this section a relatively simple proof of the known fact that ILW is a complete logic.
In what follows we let Φ be some fixed finite adequate set and reason with ILW (e.g. ⊢ is ILW-provable, and consistent is ILW-consistent). The rest of this section is devoted to the proof of the following theorem. Suppose ⊢ G. Let Φ = Φ(¬G) and let Γ ⊆ Φ be a maximal consistent set that contains ¬G. We will construct a Veltman model W, R, {S w : w ∈ W }, V in which for each w ∈ W we have that (S w ; R) is conversely well-founded. Each w ∈ W will be a tuple the second component of which-denoted by (w) 1 -will be a maximal consistent subset of Φ. For some w ∈ W we will have (w) 1 = Γ and we will finish the proof by proving a truth lemma: w A iff A ∈ (w) 1 .
Let the height of a maximal consistent ∆ ⊆ Φ be defined as the number of -formulas in ∆ minus the number of -formulas in Γ. For sequences σ 0 and σ 1 we write σ 0 ⊆ σ 1 iff σ 0 is an initial, but not necessarily proper subsequence of σ 1 . For two sequences σ 0 and σ 1 , σ 0 * σ 1 denotes the concatenation of the two sequences. If S is a set of formulas then S is the sequence of length one and only element S. Let us now define W, R, {S w : w ∈ W }, V . 
We shall now see that this defines an ILW-model. First we see that R behaves properly. Proof. Transitivity follows from the fact that (
Converse well-foundedness now follows from the fact that our model is finite and R is irreflexive. ⊣ Next we show that the S w -relations comply with their requirements.
Lemma 7.3. wRxRy implies xS w y. Also wRx implies xS w x. Finally, S w is transitive.
Proof. The first two assertions hold by definition. So suppose xS w yS w z. Let us fix (x) 0 ⊇ (w) 0 * S , (y) 0 ⊇ (w) 0 * T and (z) 0 ⊇ (w) 0 * U . We distinguish two cases. Case 1: xRy or x = y. If x = y then we are done so we assume xRy. If yRz or y = z then we are also easily done. So, we assume that for some C D ∈ (w) 1 we have ¬C ∈ U and, C ∈ (y) 1 or C ∈ (y) 1 . Since (x) 1 ≺ (y) 1 we have that C ∈ (x) 1 and thus we conclude xS w z. Case 2: ¬xRy and x = y. In this case there exists some C D ∈ (w) 1 with ¬C ∈ T and C ∈ (x) 1 or C ∈ (x) 1 . Whatever the reason for yS w z is, we always have T ⊆ U and thus ¬C ∈ U . So we conclude xS w z. ⊣ Finally, we check the frame condition for W.
Proof. Suppose we have an infinite sequence
For each i ≥ 0, fix X i and Y i such that (x i ) 0 ⊇ (w) 0 * X i and (y i ) 0 ⊇ (w) 0 * Y i . We may assume that, for each i, x i = y i and ¬x i Ry i . Fix i. Let C i D i be the formula as given by Condition 3b. We thus have C i D i ∈ (w) 1 , where ¬C i ∈ Y i and, C i ∈ (x i ) 1 or C i ∈ (x i ) 1 . For any j > i, this implies ¬C i ∈ X j which gives ¬C i ∈ (x j ) 1 and thus ¬C i , ¬C i ∈ (y j ) 1 . The latter gives C i = C j , which is a contradiction since Φ is finite. ⊣
We conclude the proof of Theorem 7.1 by proving a truth lemma.
Lemma 7.5 (Truth lemma). For all F ∈ Φ and w ∈ W we have F ∈ (w) 1 iff w F .
Proof. We proceed by induction on F . The cases of the propositional variables and the connectives are easily provable using properties of MCS's and the relation. So suppose F = A B.
(⇒) Suppose we have A B ∈ (w) 1 . Then for all v such that wRv and v A we have to find a u such that vS w u B which, by the induction hypothesis, is equivalent to B ∈ (u) 1 . Consider such a v. We have for some S that (v) 0 = (w) 0 * S * τ and (w) 1 ≺ Φ S (v) 1 . By the induction hypothesis we see that A ∈ (v) 1 , so by Lemma 6.4 there is a MCS ∆ such that (w) 1 ≺ Φ S∪{ ¬A} ∆ ∋ B. We take u = (w) 0 * S ∪ { ¬A} , ∆ . Now 3b holds whence vS w u.
(⇐) Suppose that A B / ∈ (w) 1 . Then ¬(A B) ∈ (w) 1 whence by Lemma 6.3 there is a MCS ∆ such that (w) 
Labels and transitive closure
The labelling that was considered in this paper so far was concerned with two or three worlds at a time. Due to the transitivity of R, labelling longer sequences often simplifies to labelling pairs or triples of worlds.
In this section, we show that labelling sequences in ILR-models indeed reduces to labelling triples of worlds. The completeness of the logic ILR w.r.t. the ordinary Veltman semantics is still an open problem. The fact that labels for this logic are compatible with transitive closures makes our labelling a good candidate for the step-by-step completeness proofs such as the construction method [GJ08] .
In the next section we deal with logics whose labelling does not trivially reduce to labelling pairs or triples of worlds. At the moment, the only logics falling into this category that we know of are various extensions of ILW. An example is ILWR, which may also be the most interesting example since it is the simplest logic among those whose (in)completeness status is currently open.
There is an easily identifiable problem in taking transitive closures when working with assuringness. Suppose we are working in ILR. Let us recall the labelling lemma for ILR, Lemma 5.5:
Consider the two pictures in Figure 8 . If we compute the label between the lower world and the upper world it does make a difference whether we first compute the label between the lower world and ∆ (left picture) or the label between Γ and the upper world (right picture). We will show in Lemma 8.1 below that in the situation as given in Figure 8 we have
And we should thus opt for the strategy as depicted in the leftmost picture when computing the transitive closure of R.
¬T jk ∈ ∆ and ¬A ∈ ∆ T . ⊣ 9 Non-trivial labellings of sequences
We will start this section with a presentation of an issue concerning labelling in ILWR. We will then proceed to work with ILP, another logic exhibiting the same issue (if we wish to prove a slightly stronger completeness result than the standard one). We switch from ILWR to ILP because we do not have a full proof of completeness of ILWR, while with ILP we can give a full completeness proof together with a to-the-point presentation on how to deal with logics with non-trivial labelling of sequences. Recently, tools from an earlier version [BGJ04] of this paper have been used as one of the key ingredients in the completeness proof of ILR and other logics w.r.t. generalised semantics [MV20] . A natural next step is to tackle the completeness of ILWR. However, when one tries to combine the completeness proofs for ILW and ILR, a problem occurs. Let us first discuss this problem, and then see how a more elaborate labelling system can help. At the moment we do not know if the labelling systems will lead to a completeness proof of ILWR. However the panorama looks promising. The problem that arises when addressing ILWR also occurs in a completeness proof for ILP and there we can solve it. Thus, the above mentioned elaborate labelling systems should at least be an ingredient, if not the whole solution, in proving the more interesting completeness results.
Suppose 5 we are building a model step-by-step (as in the construction method [GJ08]) and we have A B ∈ w ≺ S x ≺ T u ∋ A. So, we need to find some v with B ∈ v and a sufficiently strong label for wRv; and then declare uS w v. Using the labelling lemmas for W and R, it is easy to find v with w ≺ S∪x T ∪{ ¬C} v for some C contained either in u or in a world R-accessible from u. Let us for the moment suppose that any such v fits our purposes. Now, assume that at some later point during the construction, a world z appears with vRz. By the frame condition of the principle R, we should have uS x z. If we were building an ILR-model (and not an ILWR-model), we would have to ensure just that z has the same assuringness as u with respect to x, that is, xRz should be labelled with T . Since we are building an ILWR-model and in order to ensure the frame condition for W, in addition to that we are to find a formula C ′ with x ≺ T ∪{ ¬C ′ } z. An obvious candidate for C ′ is C. However, from w ≺ S∪x T ∪{ ¬C} v ≺ z we only get x ≺ T z (Lemma 22, [MV20] ), and what we would like is to have x ≺ T ∪{ ¬C} z. Let us refer to this phenomenon as the problem of label iteration.
One way to solve this problem is to simply require ¬C to appear at the right place in the original label, i.e., instead of asking for w ≺ S∪x T ∪{ ¬C} v, we ask for w ≺ S∪x T ∪{ ¬C} ∪{ ¬C} v.
(2)
If we are proving completeness w.r.t. generalised semantics using the approach from [MV20] , this means that we should add a new condition in the definition of S w (Definition 28, [MV20] ). However, similar to how the original condition concerning two worlds requires us to add the new condition concerning three worlds that we just described, this condition itself requires us to add another condition, this time concerning four worlds. Let us illustrate this. Suppose we have the following situation (see Figure 9 ):
It turns out the problem of label iteration, that, as we just saw, occurs with ILWR, also occurs when trying to prove that ILP is complete w.r.t. the class of generalised ILP-frames where an additional requirement which ensures (W) gen is present. 6 In the remainder of this section we will give a detailed exposition on how to handle this problem in the case of ILP. The same general approach should be useful for any other extension of ILW that exhibits the problem of label iteration.
We will now introduce the labelling system for ILP and prove the completeness of ILP w.r.t. the class of generalised ILP-frames where an additional requirement which ensures (W) gen is present.
(P) gen :
Recall the labelling lemma for ILP (Lemma 5.5.1):
The actual labelling that we use is an iterated generalisation of this property. Thus, instead of defining labels between pairs of MCS's, we consider tuples of MCS's with labels between them: w n ≺ Sn w n−1 ≺ Sn−1 · · · ≺ S1 w 0 . We wish to define labels for ILP similar to the ones for ILWR between w and v in (2) and (3). We will first define these labels, and then prove the appropriate labelling lemma.
Definition 9.1. For n ∈ ω\{0}, let (w i ) i∈{0,...,n} be a finite sequence of ILP-MCS's, let (S i ) i∈{1,...,n} be a finite sequence of sets of formulas and B be a formula. We will define a sequence of sets of formulas, and we will denote this sequence as (Q((w i ) i∈{0,...,n} , (S i ) i∈{1,...,n} , B, j)) j∈{1,...,n} .
Usually the MCS's (w i ) i∈{0,...,n} and the sets of formulas (S i ) i∈{1,...,n} will be clear from the context, so we will write Q j (B) for Q((w i ) i∈{0,...,n} , (S i ) i∈{1,...,n} , B, j). We now recursively define the elements of our sequence:
Note that the preceding definition amounts to the following:
The requirement we mention is that whenever w ≺ S u and we are making an Sw-successor
Since ILP contains ILW, we already know that ILP is complete w.r.t. the class of generalised ILPframes that satisfy (W)gen. We do not, however, know in general if the models obtained by the standard completeness argument also satisfy this specific requirement (which is, at least a priori, stronger than (W)gen).
Lemma 9.2. Let n ∈ ω\{0} be arbitrary, (w i ) i∈{0,...,n} be a finite sequence of ILP-MCS's, (S i ) i∈{1,...,n} a finite sequence of sets of formulas and B C a formula such that:
Then there is an ILP-MCS v such that w n ≺ Qn(B) v and C, ¬C ∈ v.
Proof. We prove the claim by induction on n. In the base case we are to find v such that w 1 ≺ S1∪{ ¬B} v. But this is just Lemma 5.8.
Let us prove the claim for n + 1. Fix MCS's (w i ) i∈{0,...,n,n+1} , labels (S i ) i∈{1,...,n,n+1} and a formula B C. Assume
From w n+1 ≺ w n and the axiom P we have B C ∈ w n . By the induction hypothesis, there is v with w n ≺ Qn(B) v ∋ C, ¬C. From w n+1 ≺ Sn+1 w n ≺ Qn(B) v and the labelling lemma for ILP (Lemma 5.1) we have:
Note that the last line shows that a simpler definition of Q j+1 (B) would suffice:
. However, the purpose of this section is to introduce a method for dealing with arbitrary extensions of ILW. We do not think it is likely that such a simplification could be made in the case of more interesting logics, such as ILWR.
In the remainder of this section, D will always be assumed to be a finite set of formulas closed under taking subformulas and single negations, and ⊤ ∈ D (i.e. ⊥ → ⊥ ∈ D).
Next we define the structures w.r.t. which we later prove completeness. When defining S w we have to take care to make it compatible with the properties of a generalised Veltman model, in particular, the property that wRu implies uS w {u} and the property that wRuRv implies uS w {v}. So, if we fix w and u, we should have uS w {v} for all v ∈Ṙ[u](= R[u] ∪ {u}). However, because of monotonicity, we want not only uS w {v} in such cases, but also uS w V for all V ⊆ R[v] that contain v. This is why we add the condition (a) in the definition below.
Note that in the definition below, worlds are sets of formulas. Because of this, the operation Ṙ [u] makes sense and defines a set of formulas.
Definition 9.3. We say that M = (W, R, {S w : w ∈ W }, ) is the ILWPstructure for a set of formulas D if:
• W = {w : w is an ILP-MCS and for some B ∈ D, B ∧ ¬B ∈ w};
• wRu ⇔ w ≺ u;
• uS w V ⇔ wRu and V ⊆ R[w] and, moreover, one of the following holds:
we have for all n ∈ ω\{0}, all (w i ) i∈{0,...,n} , and all (S i ) i∈{1,...,n} :
Since from now on all the MCS's we talk about are elements of some ILWPstructure, we can somewhat simplify the definition of the assuring successor (Definition 3.4). In particular, we do not need to find the formula C contained in one MCS but not the other. This was used as a strategy of stopping infinite ascending R-chains, but here we ensure converse well-foundedness of R already in the definition of W .
Lemma 9.4. The ILWP-structure M for D is a generalised Veltman model. Furthermore, the following holds for each w ∈ W and G ∈ D:
Proof. Let us first verify that the ILWP-structure M = (W, R, {S w : w ∈ W }, ) for D is a generalised Veltman model. All the properties, except for quasi-transitivity, have easy proofs (see [MV20] , the proof of Lemma 29).
Let us prove quasi-transitivity. Thus, we assume uS w V , and vS w U v for all v ∈ V . We put U = v∈V U v and claim that uS w U . Clearly U ⊆ R[w]. To prove uS w U we will distinguish cases from the definition of the relation S w for uS w V.
In Case (a), there exists a MCS v 0 ∈ V for some v 0 ∈Ṙ[u]. We will next distinguish two Cases from the definition of v 0 S w U v0 .
In Case (aa) we can find x ∈ U v0 for some x ∈Ṙ[v 0 ]. Since v 0 ∈Ṙ[u], also x ∈Ṙ [u] . And since x ∈ U v0 ⊆ U , we have U ∩Ṙ[u] = ∅. So, we have uS w U as required.
In Case (ab):
For all n ∈ ω\{0}, all (w i ) i∈{0,...,n} , and all (S i ) i∈{1,...,n} we have:
To prove uS w U in this case, we will use Case (b) from the definition of the relation S w . Let n ∈ ω\{0} be arbitrary and let (w i ) i∈{0,...,n} and (S i ) i∈{1,...,n} be arbitrary such that w = w n ≺ Sn · · · ≺ S1 w 0 = u. If u = v 0 , applying the formula above with the worlds (w i ) i∈{0,...,n} and the labels (S i ) i∈{1,...,n} produces the required x ∈ U v0 and B ∈ D ∩ Ṙ [v 0 ]. Otherwise, i.e. if uRv 0 , let w ′ 0 = v 0 , w ′ i+1 = w i , S ′ 1 = ∅, S ′ i+1 = S i and apply the formula above with n + 1, the sequence (w ′ i ) i∈{0,...,n+1} and the labels (S ′ i ) i∈{1,...,n+1} . This gives us a world x ∈ U v0 and a formula B ∈ D ∩ Ṙ [v 0 ] with:
Weakening this fact (by removing u ⊡ ∅∪{ ¬B} ) we have the required property. Since uRv 0 or u = v 0 , we haveṘ[v 0 ] ⊆Ṙ[u]. Thus we can reuse B for this S w transition.
In Case (b):
To prove uS w U we will use Case (b) from the definition of the relation S w . So, let n ∈ ω\{0} be arbitrary and let (w i ) i∈{0,...,n} and (S i ) i∈{1,...,n} be arbitrary such that w = w n ≺ Sn · · · ≺ S1 w 0 = u.
By the assumption of this case, there are v 0 ∈ V and B ∈ D ∩ Ṙ [u] such that w ≺ Qn(B) v 0 . From v 0 ∈ V we have v 0 S w U v0 . We will next distinguish the possible cases in the definition for v 0 S w U v0 .
In the first Case (ba) we have U v0 ∩Ṙ[v 0 ] = ∅, i.e. there is x ∈ U v0 such that either v 0 = x or v 0 Rx. In both cases we have w ≺ Qn(B) x.
In Case (bb), we have (Case (b) for v 0 S w U v0 applied to n = 1 and S 1 = Q n (B)) that there are some x ∈ U v0 and B ′ ∈ D∩ Ṙ [v 0 ] such that w ≺ Qn(B)∪{ ¬B ′ } x. By weakening, w ≺ Qn(B) x, as required.
We claim that for each formula G ∈ D and each world w ∈ W the following holds:
M, w G if and only if G ∈ w.
The proof is by induction on the complexity of G. The only non-trivial case is when G = B C. Assume B C ∈ w, wRu and u B. Induction hypothesis implies B ∈ u. We claim that uS w [C] w by Case (b) from the definition of S w . Clearly wRu and [C] w ⊆ R[w].
Fix n ∈ ω\{0}, (w i ) i∈{0,...,n} and (S i ) i∈{1,...,n} . Assume w = w n ≺ Sn · · · ≺ S1 w 0 = u. Since B C ∈ w 0 and B ∈ w 0 , Lemma 9.4 implies that there is an ILP-MCS v with w 0 ≺ Qn(B) v and C, ¬C ∈ v (thus v ∈ W ). Since C ∈ v, the induction hypothesis implies v C. Proof. In the light of Lemma 9.4, it suffices to show that the ILWP-structure M for D possesses the property (P) gen . 7 Let us prove (P) gen . Let wRw ′ RuS w V and take V ′ = V ∩ R[w ′ ]. We claim uS w ′ V ′ .
We distinguish two possible cases for uS w V . If it holds by Case (a), there is v ∈ V such that either u = v or uRv. In both cases w ′ Rv. Let U = {v}. Clearly U ⊆ V . Since w ′ RuRv, uS w ′ {v}, i.e. uS w ′ U . The remainder of the proof deals with the case when uS w V holds by Case (b) from the definition of S w .
Fix n ∈ ω\{0}, the worlds (w i ) i∈{0,...,n} and the labels (S i ) i∈{1,...,n} . Assume w ′ = w n ≺ Sn · · · ≺ S1 w 0 = u. We have w ≺ ∅ w n ≺ Sn · · · ≺ S1 w 0 . Now the definition of uS w V implies there is v ∈ V with:
We claim that w n ≺ Qn(B) v. Assume A ¬F i ∈ w n with F i ∈ Q n (B) (we are to show that ¬A, ¬A ∈ v). Clearly ¬A, ¬A ∈ w n ⊡ Qn(B) . Since a ≺ S b implies S ⊆ b, we have ¬A, ¬A ∈ v.
⊣
